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FAIR TREATMENT FOR CONTRACTORS DOING 
BUSINESS WITH THE STATE OF MARYLAND 
Scott A. Livingstont t 
Prior to 1981, there existed in Maryland a wide assortment of 
procurement laws, because virtually every state agency used dif-
ferent procedures to award procurement contracts. The passage 
of a Procurement Article, effective July 1, 1981, established a 
body of uniform procurement procedures for state agencies. This 
article examines past and present procurement practices in 
Maryland and provides suggestions to guide future modification 
of the Procurement Article. The author posits that by enacting 
the Procurement Article, the Maryland General Assembly en-
acted into positive law the important public policy of providing 
fair treatmentfor contractors who do business with the state. The 
policy of fair treatment benefits Maryland taxpayers and con-
tractors and should remain the focus of procurement law in 
Maryland. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Procurement 
Article,l which incorporates into Maryland law the policy of providing 
fair treatment for persons who deal with the state procurement system. 2 
Prior to the Article taking effect in 1981, Maryland did not have a com-
prehensive statute that regulated procurement of public works by state 
agencies. 
t B.A., Clark University, 1972; J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1975; Assistant Attor-
ney General of Maryland, 1976-83; Partner, Dempsey, Bastianelli & Brown, 
Bethesda, Maryland, Springfield, Virginia and Washington, D.C. 
t This article is based on a series of columns on procurement that Mr. Livingston has 
published in the Daily Record. 
1. See Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 21, §§ 1-101 to 9-218 (1981». Recently, Article 21 was transferred to 
Division II of the newly created State Finance and Procurement Article. See Act of 
Apr. 9, 1985, ch. 12, 1985 Md. Laws 1099 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 11-101 to 19-218 (1985». During the 1986 legislative session, the General 
Assembly passed the Procurement Law Revision Act, which reorganizes and modi-
fies slightly the Procurement Article. See Procurement Law Revision Act, ch. 840, 
1986 Md. Laws. The effective date of the Act is July 1, 1987. The reorganization 
alters the numbering scheme of the Procurement Article. The renumbered sections 
are provided herein where applicable. 
2. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2661. 
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The Article was enacted to provide for a comprehensive and impar-
tial system of procurement. 3 In the opinion of the General Assembly, 
persons who have a reasonable expectation of fair treatment from the 
state will compete more vigorously for state contracts.4 The Procurement 
Article contains provisions that were designed to implement the fair 
treatment policy. Specific provisions govern the manner in which the 
state awards contracts. 5 Other provisions specify mandatory terms for 
inclusion in contracts6 and establish a method for resolution of disputes. 7 
This article examines procurement methods used by various state 
agencies prior to 1981. The article explains the laws that govern state 
procurement of public works and evaluates the degree to which the Pro-
curement Article has provided fair treatment for contractors working for 
the state. Section II describes the recent history of Maryland procure-
ment with emphasis on the period immediately preceding 1981. Section 
II also discusses procurement of architectural and engineering services, 
use of procurement to achieve socio-economic policy, and development 
of dispute resolution procedures. Section III examines the methods used 
to award contracts and resolve disputes under the Procurement Article. 
In addition, section III discusses cases in which Maryland appellate 
courts reviewed disputes resolved by a board of contract appeals. 8 In sec-
tion IV, the author addresses the future of Maryland procurement and 
presents suggestions for modifying the system in a manner that advances 
the policies underlying the Procurement Article, especially the policy of 
promoting fair treatment of contractors doing business with the state. 
II. PROCUREMENT PRIOR TO 1981 
The history of Maryland is reflected in the history of public works, 
to borrow a phrase from Victor Hugo.9 Events of political history, fortu-
nate and otherwise, have influenced legislation governing procurement of 
public works by the state. 
A. How Contracts Were Awarded 
1. General 
Prior to 1981, the methods state agencies used to award contracts 
3. Id. at 2661-62. 
4.Id. 
5. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 13-201 to 207 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-109 to 115 (1987». 
6. Id. at § 13-602 (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122 (1987». 
7. Id. at §§ 17-201 to 203 (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-137 
to 139 (1987». 
8. The cases contained in Section III originally were decided by either the Department 
of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals or its successor, the Maryland State 
Board of Contract Appeals. 
9. 3 VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES 127 (Thomas Nelson & Sons). Hugo observed 
that "[t]he history of men is reflected in the history of sewers .... " Id. 
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were dictated by the Board of Public Works lO and the General Assem-
bly.1I The seminal powers of the Board of Public Works could be cir-
cumscribed by the General Assembly; 12 however, the General Assembly 
did not enact a comprehensive procurement statute limiting the scope of 
the Board's powers until 1981. Approval by the Board of Public Works 
. usually provided sufficient authorization for a state agency to award a 
contract. 13 
Instead of enacting a comprehensive procurement statute, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted legislation that created various executive branch 
agencies. The enabling legislation for these agencies usually contained 
provisions that mandated the manner in which the new agencies would 
conduct procurement. 14 The methods of procurement used by state agen-
cies varied depending upon the activities performed by the respective 
agencies. For instance, the General Assembly might authorize a state 
agency to obtain federal monies to finance its activities 15 and empower 
the agency to contract in any manner necessary to secure federal funds. 16 
Because it was authorized to comply with any federally mandated term 
or condition, the agency's method of awarding contracts was not consis-
tent necessarily with the methods utilized by other state agencies. The 
pre-1981 practice of providing for procurement methods in enabling leg-
islation produced a lack of uniformity in the procurement methods used 
by state agencies. 
2. Architectural and Engineering Contracts 
Contracts for procurement of architectural and engineering services 
have experienced an unfortunate history in Maryland. The political ac-
tivities of certain state officials revealed that on occasion architectural 
and engineering contracts were awarded on the basis of subjective, rather 
10. The Board of Public Works includes the Governor, the Comptroller of the Treas-
ury, and the Treasurer. MD. CONST. art. XII, § 1. 
11. See 42 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 90 (1957). For example, there was nothing in the Consti-
tution or statutes of Maryland that required the Department of Public Improve-
ments to invite sealed bids for construction contracts. 38 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 245, 
246 (1953). 
12. 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 716, 725-27 (1977). 
13. See Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937); Brown v. C&O Canal Co., 
73 Md. 567, 603 (1890); see also 42 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 90 (1957) (opining that 
award of contracts by the Board of Public Works was not reviewable unless tainted 
by fraud, collusion, or breach of trust). 
14. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 8, 1908, ch. 141, § 320, 1908 Md. Laws 252 (providing pro-
curement methods for the State Roads Commission) (current version at MD. 
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 8-614 (1977 & Supp. 1985»; Act of Mar. 26, 1956, ch. 2, 
1956 Md. Laws - Special Sess. 17 (providing procurement methods for the Mary-
land Port Authority) (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 62B, § 5(s) (1957» (repealed 
by Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 21, 1980 Md. Laws 2727). 
15. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5-213(b) (Supp. 1985) (State Aviation Ad-
ministration). 
16. [d. 
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than objective, evaluation of technical proposals.1 7 In some instances, it 
was alleged that architects and engineers inflated their bid prices to cover 
kickbacks to corrupt politicians. 18 
Prior to 1974, before awarding a contract for architectural or engi-
neering services, state agency officials solicited expressions of interest 
from qualified architects and engineers. This practice led to a form of 
competitive negotiation among the architects and engineers willing to 
compete under such circumstances. 19 Agency officials, some of whom 
served at the pleasure of the governor, exercised broad discretion in the 
selection of a project architect and engineer.2o Fair treatment for archi-
tects and engineers who attempted to bid on public works projects was 
not guaranteed adequately by Maryland law,21 
In 1974, the General Assembly enacted legislation designed to open 
architectural and engineering procurement to public scrutiny.22 The leg-
islation established two new administrative boards. One board served the 
Department of General Services and the other served the Department of 
Transportation. Each board was responsible for providing recommenda-
tions to the Board of Public Works regarding the selection of professional 
architectural and engineering services for its agency. 23 
The 1974 legislation required both Professional Services Selection 
Boards, which generally followed similar regulations,24 to announce pub-
licly each request for procurement of architectural and engineering serv-
ices exceeding $25,000.25 Each announcement described the type of 
services the state was seeking (e.g., landscape architecture, highway de-
17. R. COHEN & J. WHITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY 10,92-94, 114-16, 127-30,349 
(1974) [hereinafter cited as A HEARTBEAT AWAY]. 
18. Id. at 114-15. 
19. /d. 
20. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 40 (1957) (State Roads Commission) (repealed by 
Act of Mar. 8, 1977, ch. 13, § I, 1977 Md. Laws 21); see also A HEARTBEAT 
AWAY, supra note 17, at 114-16 (discussing tenure of Jerome Wolff, Chairman of 
the Maryland State Roads Commission under Governor Agnew). 
21. 62 Op. Md. Att'y. Gen. 716, 733 (1977). 
22. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2528 (recodified as amended at MD. 
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-101 to 118 (Transp.), 19-201 to 218 (Gen. 
Serv.) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-149 to 184 
(Gen. Serv.) (1987». 
23. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2533-34 (recodified as amended at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-11O(a) (Transp.), 19-21O(a) (Gen. Serv.) 
(1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-158(a) (Transp.), 
11-176(a) (Gen. Serv.) (1987». 
24. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 231N(a)(I) (Transp.), 231N(a)(2) (Gen. Serv.) 
(Supp. 1975) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE §§ 19-105(b) (Transp.), 19-
205(b) (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
153(a) (Transp.), 11-171(a) (Gen. Serv.) (1987». 
25. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2533 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 41, § 231P(d)(I) (Supp. 1975». The threshold dollar amount required for public 
announcement of procurement requests subsequently was deleted from Maryland 
law. Act of May 28,1985, ch. 744,1985 Md. Laws 3514 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 19-107(a) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 11-155(a) (1987». 
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sign, etc.) and provided a procedure that interested parties could use to 
obtain additional information.26 Each agency established a committee to 
interview and screen potential consultants. These consultant screening 
committees, appointed for various projects, reviewed prospective archi-
tects and engineers and identified those whose expertise dovetailed with 
the needs of the state.27 The consultant screening committees evaluated 
proposals received from architects and engineers and recommended qual-
ified candidates to the appropriate Professional Services Selection 
Board.28 
The Selection Board, in turn, made recommendations to the Board 
of Public Works, based on criteria set forth in the 1974 legislation.29 
These criteria were the most important elements of the 1974 legislation. 
The selection process required by the 1974 legislation included a compet-
itive evaluation of technical and price proposals submitted by architects 
or engineers. 30 Most significantly, the 1974 legislation provided that 
neither the technical proposal nor the price proposal could be the sole 
criterion supporting a recommendation on a competitive basis.31 In the-
ory, inclusion of this provision caused officials to balance both price and 
technical proposals in making their recommendations. 
The 1974 statute also contained substantial safeguards against cor-
ruption. These safeguards represented the original reason for enacting 
the legislation: prevention of undue political influence in the award of 
architectural and engineering contracts. When bidding for projects of 
$25,000 or more, architects and engineers were required to execute a 
"truth-in-negotiation" certificate stating that the costs supporting the 
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 23IP(d)(2) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-107 (Transp.), 19-208 (Gen. Serv.) (1985)) (recodi-
fied at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-155 (Transp.), 11-174 (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987)). 
27. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 03.01.08A(2) (Gen. Serv.); tit. 11, § 01.07.11 (Transp.) 
(1975) (current versions at MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 12.04.11 (Gen. Serv.), 
12.02.11 (Transp.) (1985)). 
28. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § .03.01.08A(2) (Gen. Serv.); tit. II, § 01.07.11 (Transp.) 
(1975) (current versions at MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 12.04.11G (Gen. Serv.), 
12.02.IIG(I) (Transp.) (1985)). 
29. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, § I, 1974 Md. Laws 2530 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 41, § 23IP(d)(4) (Supp. 1975)) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-110 (Transp.), 19-210 (Gen. Serv.) (1985)) (recodified at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-158 (Transp.), 11-174 (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987)). 
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 23IP(d)(4) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(ii) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(ii) (Gen. Serv.) 
(1985)). 
31. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2532 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 41, § 2310 (Supp. 1975)). This portion of the 1974 legislation has been amended; 
the agencies are required to contract with a qualified firm for a reasonable price. See 
Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 744, 1985 Md. Laws 3515, 3517 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(i) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(2)(ii) (Gen. Serv.) 
(1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a) (Transp.), 
I I-I 75(a)(2)(ii) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)). 
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agreed-upon compensation were accurate as of the time of contracting.32 
Along with their price quotations, architects and engineers also submit-
ted affidavits certifying that they had not engaged in any collusive acts. 33 
It generally was illegal for a prospective architect or engineer to pay any-
one, other than a bona fide employee, a fee contingent on the making of a 
contract for architectural or engineering services.34 The rates charged by 
architects and engineers were subject to audit. 35 Anyone who violated 
these provisions was subject to prosecution for a felony.36 
As a practical matter, however, the selection of architectural and 
engineering consultants for state projects remained a subjective process. 
Although state officials were provided with specific criteria for selection, 
namely price and technical proposals, evaluation necessarily remained a 
matter of broad discretionary judgment on the part of state officials.37 
B. Terms of the Procurement Contract 
1. No Uniformity Prior to 1981 
Prior to 1981, state law did not require the inclusion of uniform 
terms in state contracts for procurement of public works construction 
services. The contract terms differed from agency to agency. It is diffi-
cult to say whether the particular terms used reflected the diverse needs 
of each agency or merely the personal preferences of various procure-
ment officers. 
The general terms of most public works contracts granted remedies 
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231R(a) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-111 (Transp.), 19-211 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-159 (Transp.), 11-177 (Gen. Serv.) (1987». 
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231S (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-112 (Transp.), 19-212 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-160 (Transp.), 11-178 (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987»; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-901 (1981) (current version at MD. 
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-901 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-210 (1987». 
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231V (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-114 (Transp.), 19-214 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-162 (Transp.), 11-180 (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987». 
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231U (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-115 (Transp.), 19-215 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-163 (Transp.), 11-181 (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987». 
36. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231W(c) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-117 (Transp.), 19-217 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at 
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-165 (Transp.), 11-183 (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987». 
37. In fact, one major scandal occurred during the ten year history of the statute. In 
1977, political tampering in the selection of the construction manager for the Balti-
more Metro motivated the Secretary of Transportation, Harry R. Hughes, to resign 
in protest from Governor Marvin Mandel's cabinet. See Livingston, Impact 0/ the 
Baltimore Metro on State Procurement, Daily Record, Nov. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 5; see 
also 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 716, 735 n.3 (1977). 
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under the contract upon the occurrence of specific events during per-
formance of the contract. For example, one term might allow for addi-
tional compensation to the contractor if unusual subsurface conditions 
increased the contractor's costs. Unfortunately, there was no uniformity 
in utilization of contract terms among state agencies. A prospective con-
tractor might find that the Mass Transit Administration incorporated 
different remedy-granting terms in a contract for the construction of a 
parking lot than did the State Aviation Administration. Both the Mass 
Transit and State Aviation Administrations were included in the Mary-
land Department of Transportation (MDOT);38 however, prior to 1976, 
neither agency was required to provide the same relief if, for instance, a 
contractor encountered unforeseen subsurface conditions. 
In the early seventies, MDOT conducted a study of the various 
clauses used by the modal administrations of MDOT.39 MDOT found 
that numerous, often conflicting clauses were contained in boilerplate 
procurement contracts.40 In 1976, after several years of study, MDOT 
adopted its "General Provisions for Construction Contracts."41 
The General Provisions were important for several reasons. First, 
the terms set out in the General Provisions fairly allocated the risks in-
herent in public works construction. Second, the General Provisions rep-
resented a major effort to coordinate the procurement practices of the 
agencies in MDOT, the department that enjoyed the largest public works 
budget in state government. Third, the provisions were modeled so 
closely on federal clauses that case law construing the federal clauses 
could be used to provide guidance under Maryland law for interpretation 
of the terms contained in the General Provisions.42 Previously, because 
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, there had been a dearth of Mary-
land case law on contract claims against the government.43 
The sudden application of familiar federal clauses and case law en-
couraged national competition for state contracts, especially on the Balti-
more Metro project. Only a limited number of contractors can procure 
the finances, equipment, and other resources needed to build subway sta-
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 207A (1971) (recodified as amended at MD. TRANSP. 
CODE ANN. § 2-107(a) (Supp. 1985». 
39. Brief for Appellant at 5-7, Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 
50 Md. App. 525, 438 A.2d 1374 (1982). 
40. The Department of Transportation was created by the Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 526, 
§ 1, 1970 Md. Laws 1143 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 207 (1971» (current 
version at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-101 (1977». 
41. The General Provisions are discussed in the June 30, 1977 internal MDOT memo-
randum regarding System for Resolving Contract Disputes, noted in Maryland Port 
Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 536 n.8, 438 A.2d 
1374, 1381 n.8 (1982). 
42. Dewey Jordan, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 258 
Md. 490, 500, 265 A.2d 892, 897 (1970). 
43. Prior to 1976, the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded judicial resolution of 
contract claims against state agencies. See American Structures, Inc. v.City of Bal-
timore, 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976); Maryland Port Admin. v. I.T.O. Corp., 
40 Md. App. 697, 395 A.2d 145 (1978); infra text accompanying notes 79-86. 
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tions and tunnels. These contractors usually are familiar with the provi-
sions used in standard federal contracts. Familiarity with the provisions 
enables contractors to anticipate the costs of risks allocated under federal 
contracts and submit their bids accordingly. Prudent contractors tend to 
compete less vigorously for contracts that contain unfamiliar or unfair 
clauses. 
2. Socio-Economic Policies 
In Maryland, the process used to award procurement contracts for 
public works incorporates procedures designed to implement socio-eco-
nomic policies identified by the General Assembly.44 Public funds are 
spent on projects in such a way as to encourage certain business practices 
that appear to be in the public interest. For example, Maryland has en-
acted legislation designed to encourage the purchase of American-made 
steel for state public works projects.45 Among the several socio-economic 
policies identified by the General Assembly,46 the one that most drasti-
cally affects traditional practices in public works procurement is the Mi-
nority Business Enterprise Program.47 
In order to understand how the Minority Business Enterprise 
(MBE) policies affected procurement, it is necessary to examine procure-
ment practices prior to 1978. Traditionally, the state awarded public 
works contracts to the low bidder based on a formal advertisement for 
sealed bids. The party identified as the low bidder became the prime con-
tractor pursuant to a contract with the state.48 
44. The socio-economic policies identified by the General Assembly are set out in MD. 
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 18-101 to 807 (1985). Clauses included in state 
procurement contracts are drafted in a fashion that will promote these policies. 
45. Buy American Steel Act, ch. 947, 1978 Md. Laws 2758 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 78A, §§ 68-72 (Supp. 1978) (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. 
CODE ANN. §§ 18-701 to 705 (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 12-405 (1987)). 
46. See, e.g., MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 18-101 (Small Business Set-Asides), 
18-201 (Disadvantaged Business Preference), 18-301 (Resident Business Prefer-
ence), 18-501 (Prevailing Wage in Contracts for Public Works), 18-701 (Steel Pro-
curement for Public Works) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 11-140 (Small Business Set-Asides), 11-141 (Disadvantaged Business Pref-
erence), 11-145 (Resident Business Preference), 12-301 (Prevailing Wage in Con-
tracts for Public Works), 12-401 (Steel Procurement for Public Works) (1987)). 
47. Since the early 1980's, a similar federal program has been referred to as the "Disad-
vantaged Business Enterprise Program." See 49 C.F.R. § 23 (1985); see also MD. 
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 11-148 (1987)); Md. Admin. Reg. vol. 5, issue 8 (1978). Additional 
programs are used in the procurement of public works to implement socio-economic 
policies. See, e.g., MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 18-301 (Resident Business 
Preference), 18-501 (Prevailing Wage in Contracts for Public Works), 18-701 (Steel 
Procurement for Public Works) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 11-145 (Resident Business Preference), 12-301 (Prevailing Wage in Con-
tracts for Public Works), 12-401 (Steel Procurement for Public Works) (1987)). 
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231V(a)(I)(ii) (1957 & Supp. 1977) (contracts awarded 
on a competitive basis). 
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When a prime contractor elected to enter into subcontracts for per-
formance of work on a project, the state generally was not involved in the 
selection of any subcontractor. The prime contractor was responsible for 
completing the project according to contract specifications; accordingly, 
he exercised virtually unlimited discretion in the selection of 
subcontractors. 
Prime contractors usually did not subcontract with businesses 
owned and operated by black individuals. Instead, prime contractors 
subcontracted with firms that they had dealt with for years, a practice 
that civil rights advocates found operated to exclude minority firms. The 
traditional practice of subcontracting with firms that the prime contrac-
tor previously had done business with tended to exclude minority busi-
nesses from participating in public works projects. 
During the mid-1970's, there was an attitudinal shift among state 
officials who came to recognize the importance of providing minority 
persons with the opportunity to work on public works projects. In the 
public sector, advocates of civil rights, equal employment opportunity, 
and affirmative action began to focus their attention on reform in the area 
of public works construction.49 In 1976, the civil rights advocates and 
their minority business constituents realized that the state was about to 
embark on construction of the largest public works project in the history 
of Maryland. 50 The Baltimore Metro project, which called for the con-
struction of an eight mile underground transit line, was estimated by 
MDOT officials at a cost of $800 million. 
It was predictable that construction contracts for the Metro project 
eventually would be awarded to large contractors who might not volun-
tarily enter into subcontracts with minority businesses. Some members of 
the Maryland General Assembly conditioned their support for the pro-
ject upon the receipt of assurances that minority businesses would par-
ticipate in the construction process.51 Political pressure mounted, 
primarily on Secretary of Transportation Harry R. Hughes, to ensure 
that minority subcontractors participated in the Baltimore Metro 
project. 
During its 1978 session, the General Assembly enacted legislation 
designed to alter the traditional practice of subcontracting on public 
works projects. 52 The legislation called for state agencies to intervene on 
behalf of minority businesses in the selection of subcontractors for major 
public works projects. As indicated in the preamble to the legislation, the 
General Assembly was "concerned that minority businesses may ex peri-
49. Livingston, Impact of the Baltimore Metro on State Procurement, Daily Record, 
Nov. 21,1983, at 6, col. 6. 
50.Id. 
51. See Minutes of Board of Public Works Meetings (Mar. 3, 1977 & Apr. 22, 1977) 
(statements of Sen. Robert Douglas). 
52. See Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575,1978 Md. Laws 1829 (codified as amended at MD. 
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 11-148 (1987». 
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ence the effect of past discrimination" in the award of subcontracts on 
state public works projects. 53 The General Assembly directed MDOT to 
establish departmental procedures for procuring construction services 
that encourage minority business participation to the extent of ten per-
cent of the dollar value of contracts exceeding $100,000.54 
Anticipating the passage of minority business legislation by the Gen-
eral Assembly, MDOT established an MBE Program.55 MDOT designed 
the MBE Program in a fashion that implemented the policy of encourag-
ing participation by minority businesses in MDOT construction 
projects. 56 
A few months after the MDOT MBE Program was established, the 
General Assembly passed its minority business legislation. The legisla-
tion defined a "minority business enterprise" as a business that is "at 
least 51 percent owned and controlled" by minority individuals. 57 The 
53. The preamble states: 
Whereas the General Assembly is concerned that minority businesses 
may have experienced the effect of past discrimination in the awarding or 
letting of contracts or subcontracts for the purchase of materials, supplies, 
equipment and services, including construction services, for the benefit of 
the State; and 
Whereas, Such discrimination, although contrary to State policy, may 
have been based solely on the minority status of such businesses, and not 
on their competency; and 
Whereas, The economic development and expansion of minority en-
terprises may have been impeded thereby; and 
Whereas, The General Assembly deems it necessary that certain de-
partments shall structure their contract procedures so as to facilitate and 
encourage the award or letting of at least 10% of their contracts and the 
subcontracts which flow therefrom to competent minority businesses; pro-
vided however, that nothing contained herein shall be construed as in-
tending to confer or as conferring upon any minority business or any 
group or individual representing a minority business, any right, privilege 
or status cognizable by a court, including, but not limited to, standing to 
challenge the award of any contract by or on behalf of the State, its offi-
cials, employees or agents, even where less than 10% of a department's 
contracts are awarded to minority businesses, it being the intention of the 
General Assembly that this Act constitute a policy direction to the Execu-
tive which is enforceable merely through the oversight function of the 
General Assembly and not through the judicial branch . . . . 
[d. at 1830. See also Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 61 Md. App. 229, 
243 n.4, 486 A.2d 224, 226 n.4 (1985) (noting that Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 193, 
1983 Md. Laws 845 substituted the word "purpose" for the word "preamble"). 
Hence, the intent of the legislature need not be gleaned exclusively from the pream-
ble to the Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575, 1978 Md. Laws 1829. Moreover, language 
in the preamble, which purports to limit minority standing to challenge state con-
tract awards, in fact, does not restrict standing. 
54. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575,1978 Md. Laws 1829 (codified as amended at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PRoe. CODE ANN. § 18-601(b)(2) (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PRoe. CODE ANN. § 11-148(b)(2) (1987)). 
55. MD. DEPT. OF TRANSP., MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (Feb. 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as 1978 MBE PROGRAM]' 
56. [d. at 1 (statement of Hermann K. Intemann, Secretary of Transportation). 
57. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575, 1978 Md. Laws 1831 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
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MDOT MBE Program used a definition of "minority business enter-
prise" somewhat different from that contained in the legislation. The 
MDOT definition emphasized the ability of an individual to influence the 
management decisions of the minority business. 58 
MDOT also promulgated guidelines for the interpretation of defini-
tions contained in the MBE Program. 59 The guidelines identified criteria 
that MDOT officials believed were dispositive of minority business sta-
tus. MDOT used the criteria to certify bona fide minority business enter-
prises that were eligible to participate in public works projects. The 
guidelines were used during the certification process to prevent "front" 
or "sham" contractors from posing as minority businesses to obtain ben-
efits available under the MBE Program.60 
Control by minority persons, or the lack thereof, was the principle 
criterion used to determine whether a particular business was a bona fide 
minority business enterprise. Control was defined as the "primary power 
to influence management" of the applicant's business.61 MDOT officials 
believed that defining control in this manner would enable MDOT to 
prevent sham minority businesses from participating in the MBE Pro-
gram.62 For example, a business that was fifty-one percent owned by a 
minority individual would not be certified if, under a voting trust or simi-
lar agreement, the business were subject to the control of a nonminority 
individual. 
Following its inception in 1978, the MBE Program was refined 
somewhat. Of particular importance is MDOT's decision to modify the 
definition of control. No longer does the definition of control focus solely 
on managerial control.63 Since 1980, MDOT has evaluated both opera-
PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-601(a)(3) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 11-148(a)(3) (1987». 
58. 1978 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 7. 
59. [d. at 8-11. 
60. [d. at 8. See also Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 61 Md. App. 239, 241, 
486 A.2d 224, 225 (1985) (stating that the certification process was developed to 
prevent "sham" or "front" contractors from using the MBE Program). Through a 
scheme or artifice, a business corporation may appear to be controlled by a minority 
individual; however, the minority individual actually is subject to undue influence 
by a non minority individual. For example, suppose the minority individual is held 
out as the chairman of the board of directors; suppose further that the minority 
individual signs a contract-in violation of his fiduciary duty to the corporation-in 
which he promises not to make any management decisions (e.g., how much to pay 
for equipment rental) without the express consent of the nonminority individual. 
The minority individual is directed by the nonminority individual to pay excessive 
prices for rental of equipment from an equipment leasing company owned by the 
nonminority individual. In this fashion, the non minority person could obtain bene-
fits from the MDOT MBE Program. 
61. 1978 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 8. 
62. [d. 
63. Compare the definition of "control" in the 1978 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 6 
("The primary power, direct or indirect, to influence the management of a business 
enterprise.") with the definition of "control" in MD. DEPT. OF TRANSP., MINORITY 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM 7 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 MBE 
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tional and managerial control.64 This bifurcated evaluation allows 
MDOT to analyze whether a minority individual has the requisite experi-
ence to run day-to-day business operations and enough managerial con-
trol to make "independent and unilateral business decisions." Retention 
of control over bond negotiations, establishment of policy goals, and pre-
vention of non-minority domination of company affairs are among the 
powers characteristically exercised by an applicant running a bona fide 
minority business enterprise. 65 
C. Resolution of Disputes 
Parties to state public works contracts recognize that disputes com-
monly, if not invariably, arise regarding the interpretation of contract 
terms. Inclusion of a "Disputes Clause," which provides a procedure for 
fairly resolving contract disputes, helps prevent litigation concerning the 
interpretation of contract terms from impeding completion of public 
works projects. Prior to 1976, the Disputes Clause provided the principal 
means that a contractor could use to obtain appropriate compensation 
from the state in the event of dispute.66 An examination of the respective 
positions of the state and the contractor illustrates the manner in which 
the Disputes Clause functions in the public works construction process. 
1. Disputes are Inherent 
Disputes are inherent in the construction of public works projects. 
A tension exists between the state and the contractor who agrees to build 
a project. Each party is oriented to the contract price, which is a fixed 
amount reached on the basis of competitive sealed bidding. Not only is 
the contract price fixed, but it is fixed as the lowest amount offered by 
any responsible contractor who competitively bid for the project. 
The rationale used to justify the practice of awarding the contract to 
the low bidder is that the practice promotes price competition among 
those seeking public works contracts. Although it may promote competi-
PROGAM] ("The primary power to direct the management and operations of the 
enteprise. "). The revised 1984 MBE PROGRAM contains specific examples to assist 
MDOT in determining whether an applicant has the requisite levels of managerial 
and operational control in a business to qualify for MBE Program benefits. Id. at 
18-21. The examples pertaining to operational control focus on an applicant's expe-
rience, decision-making ability, and technical competence. Id. at 18-20. The exam-
ples pertaining to managerial control focus on documents that may affect control of 
the business. The applicant's control of the business must not be restricted by lan-
guage contained in corporate articles and bylaws or in partnership agreements. In 
addition, the applicant must produce documents that show he is responsible for 
signing pay checks and negotiating with insurance and banking institutions. Id. at 
20-21. The published examples are not meant to be exclusive. Id. at 19,20. 
64. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 01.10.01 (1980). 
65. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 20-21. 
66. Contractual relief was the contractor's primary recourse to legal remedy because, 
prior to 1976, the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded court actions against 
the state. 
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tion, the practice of awarding to the low bidder produces an anomalous 
effect. 67 As a practical matter, awarding the contract to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder forces both the contractor and the state to search inten-
sively for means to protect, if not improve, their positions once the 
contract price is fixed and performance is begun. 
The parties' abilities to improve their respective positions largely de-
pend upon the contractual language that allocates cost risks associated 
with performance. The contractor, who has underbid his competitors to 
win the contract, wants to minimize his performance costs. Thus, the 
contractor interprets the contract language in a manner that enables him 
to render the minimum performance-at the lowest cost-that complies 
with the terms of the contract. The state, however, like any owner who 
hires a contractor, is inclined to demand the maximum possible 
performance. 68 
Contract price disputes occur because the contract price is fixed low 
and fixed early-at the time of bid opening. At this point, both the con-
tractor and the state estimate generally, but neither can estimate exactly, 
how much money it will cost to perform the contract. Hence, the con-
tractor has no extra money in his bid to pay for unforeseen expenses that 
occur during performance. To maintain its profit position, the contractor 
is justified in requesting extra compensation when unforeseen expenses 
arise. 
A public works contract generally allocates the construction risks 
and provides for a contractual means to deal with the risk that a dispute 
will arise.69 In the contract, the parties agree to make adjustments to the 
contract price upon the occurrence of certain events that affect cost or 
time of performance. For example, if the subsurface conditions at the 
project site differ materially from those indicated in the plans, the con-
67. 34 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 217 (1949). 
68. Not surprisingly, much substantive law has developed because of problems concern-
ing the proper interpretation of contract requirements. See II R. NASH & J. 
CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 978-1009 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited 
as II NASH & CIBINIC] (describing contract interpretation rules developed on the 
federal level). Dewey Jordan, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning 
Comm'n, 258 Md. 490, 265 A.2d 892 (1970), a case in which the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland interpreted the Changes Clause in a contract between a public corpo-
rate body and a private contractor, provides an example of this trend in Maryland. 
See also Appeal of Clevecon-Au-Vianini, MDOT BCA Nos. 1007, 1013, at 17-18 
(Jan. 7, 1983) (holding that contract, read as a whole, did not require tunnel walls to 
be placed on firm, undisturbed rock); Appeal of Dominion Contractors, Inc., 
MSBCA No. 1040, at 10 (May 20, 1982) (applying rule that, if possible, written 
contracts must be construed to give effect to all provisions contained therein in or-
der to uphold provision requiring contractor to seek state permission to use substi-
tute materials); Appeal of Fruin-Colnon Corp. & Horn Constr. Co., MDOT BCA 
No. 1001, at 14 (Dec. 6, 1979) (interpreting contract as a whole to require place-
ment of compressed air lines within Bolton Hill Station right of way). 
69. A primary example of the provision of a contractual means to deal with the risk of 
disputes during performance is the Disputes Clause set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. § 21.07.01.06 (1985). 
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tract price will be adjusted to compensate for increased costs incurred as 
a result. 70 A contractor who encounters subsurface conditions that differ 
materially from those indicated in the plans presents to the state a claim 
for an equitable adjustment. 71 The term "claim" is thus neutral insofar as 
it merely signifies the contractor's exercise of a right promised by the 
state. 
The parties recognize in advance that there may be disputes over 
whether an equitable adjustment is justified. Although each party is ori-
ented to the contract price, both view as advantageous the provision of a 
contractual procedure for resolving disputes regarding claims for equita-
ble adjustments arising under the contract. 72 
2. Resolution via a Disputes Clause 
The procedure that governs the resolution of disputes is set forth in 
a Disputes Clause.73 The current Disputes Clause authorizes the state to 
decide initially the proper interpretation of contract requirements. 74 
Generally, the procedure contemplates a three-tiered process. First, a 
lower-level official in the agency that commissioned the project is author-
ized to interpret the contract terms. Second, a contractor who is dissatis-
fied with the interpretation can obtain upper-level administrative review 
within the agency. While the interpretation is under review, the contrac-
tor remains obligated to perform the disputed work. Third, the contrac-
tor can appeal the agency's final decision to an outside forum that 
reviews the agency's decision.75 
Prior to 1976, the Disputes Clause in a state contract had a very 
important function, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred 
70. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-602(a)(4)(ii) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122(B)(1) (1987»; see also MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
21, § 07.02.04 (1985) (setting forth the Differing Site Conditions Clause required in 
all state construction contracts). 
71. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.01.06 (1985). 
72. For a discussion of the distinction between a claim arising under a contract and a 
claim for breach of contract, see James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 
Md. App. 74, 82-86,492 A.2d 308, 312-14 (1985). 
73. The Disputes Clause used in MDOT construction contracts since 1976 and in state 
procurement contracts since 1981 is set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, 
§ 07.01.06 (1985). The Disputes Clause used by Baltimore City is discussed in 
James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 79-81,492 A.2d 308, 
310-11 (1985). 
74. "It is axiomatic that, within reasonable limits, parties to a contract may mutually 
select their remedies for breaches or differences arising out of the performance of the 
contract." James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 75, 492 
A.2d 308, 308 (1985). James Julian provides support for the proposition that parties 
are competent to agree that in the event of a dispute one party may determine the 
meaning of the contract terms. 
75. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.01.06B(7) (1985). In current form, the Disputes 
Clause mandates that all appeals be delivered in writing to the Maryland State 
Board of Contract Appeals. 
1986] State Procurement 229 
judicial relief in contract actions against the state. 76 The remedy-granting 
clauses of the contract provided the only available contractual remedies. 
The Disputes Clause governed the manner in which these remedies were 
allowed. The clause defined both the timing and scope of procedures for 
resolving claims arising under the substantive remedy-granting clauses. 
Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented judicial re-
view of the state agency's decision regarding the proper interpretation of 
the contract terms, contractors were at the mercy of the state. Moreover, 
contractors who were interested in doing business with the state were not 
free to negotiate with various state agencies in order to obtain better 
terms.77 The contractor who wanted to work on public works projects 
was forced to take the contract as offered by the state or leave it alone.78 
3. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
Prior to 1976, contractors with the state tolerated the formidable 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Acts of the sovereign state were beyond 
the jurisdiction of Maryland Judiciary, because the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity prevented the courts from hearing any action against the state 
for breach of contract.79 With the partial waiver of sovereign immunity 
in 1976, the executive branch became amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
judiciary.80 The 1976 legislation, which partially rolled back sovereign 
immunity in Maryland, rendered state government amenable to suit 
under traditional principles of contract law.S ! 
The state, however, was not exposed to contract liability to quite the 
same degree as were private individuals. 82 Nevertheless, the partial 
waiver of sovereign immunity represented significant progress toward 
76. See 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 336, 336-37 (1977) (discussing defense of sovereign immu-
nity in Maryland prior to 1976). 
77. See J. A. La Porte Corp. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 13 F. Supp. 795, 802 (D. Md. 
1936). 
78.Id. 
79. See 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 336, 336-37 (1977). 
80. Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 
41, § lOA (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § lA (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § lA (Supp. 1976); art. 
25A, § lA (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A (Supp. 1976» (current versions at MD. 
STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to 204 (1984». 
81. See Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 
538-39,438 A.2d 1374, 1382 (1982); see also State Government & Contract Immu-
nity Act, ch. 265, 1986 Md. Laws (providing that the defense of Sovereign Immu-
nity may not be raised by the state, its officers or agencies in cases concerning 
contracts executed on behalf of the state or its agencies). For a discussion of sover-
eign immunity in the context of a public works contract, see Mass Transit Admin. v. 
Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984). 
82. The state could not be held liable for punitive damages. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, 
§ lO(A)(b) (Supp. 1977) (current version at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-
202(b) (1984». In addition, instead of the usual three year statute of limitations 
applicable in contract actions between private litigants, a one year statute of limita-
tions applied to contract actions against the state. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, 
§ lO(A)(c) (Supp. 1977) (current version at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-
203 (1984». 
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making state government accountable for legitimate claims. Moreover, 
the partial waiver of sovereign immunity offered the promise of fair treat-
ment to contractors doing business with the state. For the first time since 
1820, the courthouse door was open to state contractors. 83 
Passage of legislation that precluded the state from raising the de-
fense of sovereign immunity in contract cases modernized the procure-
ment system in Maryland by assuring contractors a fair hearing in court. 
No longer did contractors need approval from the attorney general's of-
fice in order to recover on claims against the state. 84 Waiver of sovereign 
immunity in contract cases also ended the practice of presenting claims 
to the Board of Public Works in order for the top state elected officials to 
determine whether to seek additional funds from the General Assembly 
to cover the claims.85 Perhaps the absence of any nonpolitical means for 
pursuing legitimate claims explains why, prior to 1976, "[g]enerally the 
State's agencies ha[d] experienced negligible contract claims activity."86 
4. Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals 
The 1976 waiver of sovereign immunity had a significant impact on 
disputes concerning contracts for the construction of public works. Once 
sovereign immunity was waived, it was anticipated that contractors 
would bring claims against the state. Thus, state officials were forced to 
consider which would be the best forum for resolution of disputes. 
The waiver of sovereign immunity occurred at approximately the 
same time that the design for the Baltimore Metro was completed. 
Shortly thereafter, MDOT's Mass Transit Administration awarded con-
tracts worth approximately $800 million for the construction of subway 
tunnels and stations. Prospective bidders wanted assurances that the con-
tracts would be administered fairly and that a neutral forum would be 
provided for the resolution of disputes. 87 
State officials considered three options during their deliberations 
over how to best provide for a neutral forum to resolve disputes that 
occurred during the construction of public works projects: the state court 
system, private arbitration, and an executive branch board of contract 
appeals. The state court systems offered certain positive features. Giving 
the state courts jurisdiction over public works contract disputes would 
ensure that disputes were heard in a neutral forum where both the state 
and private contractors could expect impartial resolution. In addition, 
court decisions would provide precedent to guide the resolution of future 
83. See Act of Feb. 17, 1821, ch. 210, 1820 Md. Laws; see also Calvert Assoc. v. Depart-
ment of Employment & Social Serv., 277 Md. 372, 376-79, 357 A.2d 839, 841-43 
(1976) (describing the history of sovereign immunity in Maryland prior to 1976). 
84. See, e.g., 23 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 435 (1938); 22 Op. Md. Att'y. Gen. 605 (1937). 
85. 36 Op. Md. AU'y Gen. 145 (1951). 
86. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY iii 
(Nov. 1976). 
87. Livingston, Impact of the Baltimore Metro on State Procurement, Daily Record, 
Nov. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 4. 
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disputes. On the other hand, use of the state court system to resolve dis-
putes was subject to disadvantages inherent in the system itself. First, the 
courts were backlogged with cases. Increasing the courts' jurisdiction to 
include public works contract disputes would add cases to already over-
crowded dockets and increase the time needed to reach resolution. Sec-
ond, judges usually would not have the technical expertise necessary to 
resolve the complex issues involved in disputes over the design and con-
struction of public works. 
Providing for the resolution of disputes via arbitration, such as that 
conducted by the American Arbitration Association, also had certain ad-
vantages. Arbitration, like the state courts, offered the parties a neutral 
forum. Moreover, a clause calling for the arbitration of disputes easily 
could be inserted in public works contracts.88 
Using arbitration to resolve disputes between the parties to public 
works contracts was subject to certain disadvantages. First, arbitration 
might not provide a quick resolution of the dispute. American Arbitra-
tion Association panel members have other primary occupations and, as 
a result, usually devote only a few days each month to hear any particu-
lar case. Second, arbitration decisions apply only to the parties involved 
in the dispute. A decision by an arbitration panel has no precedential 
value. A contract clause could be interpreted differently by different 
panels and a body of law would not be developed to guide contract ad-
ministration on other projects. 
With the huge subway project getting underway, MDOT sought the 
creation of a neutral quasi-judicial body whose decisions would establish 
precedents to guide the resolution of subsequent disputes. The General 
Assembly, prompted by MDOT officials, opted to establish a Board of 
Contract Appeals. 89 MDOT Board of Contract Appeals (MDOT BCA) 
was based upon a prototype proposed in the Model Procurement Code,90 
and upon various appeals boards used by the federal government.91 
88. Many private industry contracts, which utilize standard American Institute of Ar-
chitect (AlA) contract forms, include arbitration clauses. In Frederick Contractors, 
Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975), the court of 
appeals held that the arbitration clause in an AlA contract allowed an owner who 
filed for arbitration within a reasonable time to avoid foreclosure proceedings 
brought by a contractor. The owner was spared the deleterious effects of foreclosure 
until an arbitration award was returned. [d. at 315-16, 334 A.2d at 531. 
89. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 418, 1978 Md. Laws 1548 (codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2-601 to 604 (Supp. 1979» (repealed by Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 
§ 21, 1980 Md. Laws 2727). During the 1980 session, the General Assembly passed 
legislation creating the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals, which assumed 
the duties formerly discharged by MDOT Board of Contract Appeals. See Act of 
May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 9, 1980 Md. Laws 2687 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 
21, § 7-202 (1981» (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-202 
(1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-138) (1987». 
90. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS § 9-
501 (1979). 
91. For a history of the development of federal boards and the Disputes Clause, see 
Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 
232 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
MDOT BCA combined the best attributes of the other two options. 
Like arbitration and the state court system, MDOT BCA would provide 
a neutral forum. In addition, the Board was to issue published decisions 
in order to establish precedent to guide resolutions of subsequent dis-
putes.92 The Board also was given broad jurisdiction to hear and decide 
all disputes arising out of the breach of MDOT contracts.93 
MDOT BCA was not beset by disadvantages inherent in the other 
two options. Members of the Board, appointed by the governor, would be 
experts in public works construction. The enabling legislation required 
MDOT BCA to adopt rules providing for "informal, expeditious, and 
inexpensive resolution of claims and controversies."94 Moreover, there 
would be no conflicts of interest, because the board members would not 
serve at the pleasure of the MDOT Secretary, who was a party to the 
contracts out of which disputes arose.95 
III. POST-1981 MARYLAND PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
A. Passage of the Procurement Article 
The Procurement Article96 provides an equitable, modern system 
for the procurement of public works projects. Three important features 
distinguish the modern system from the procurement practices used by 
the state prior to 1981. First, the Procurement Article establishes uni-
form methods for the awarding of all state contracts.97 The preferred 
method for awarding contracts for construction of public works is com-
petitive sealed bidding.98 By using the method of competitive sealed bid-
ding, the state is obligated to award contracts for construction of public 
works to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. 99 Second, the 
LA W & CONTEMP. PROB. 39, 42-57 (1964). See also Maryland Port Admin. v. John 
W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44,46-49, 492 A.2d 281, 282 (1985). 
92. Published decisions may be obtained from the Maryland State Board of Contract 
Appeals. Beginning in the summer of 1986, decisions rendered by the Maryland 
State Board of Contract Appeals will be published formally by the Maryland Insti-
tute for Continuing Professional Education for Lawyers (MICPEL). 
93. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-603 (Supp. 1979) (repealed). 
94. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-604 (Supp. 1979) (repealed). 
95. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 2-601, 602 (Supp. 1979) (repealed). 
96. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 1-101 to 9-218 (1981) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 19-218 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 184) (1987». 
97. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-201 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109) (1987». Under the pre-1981 system, there were no 
comprehensive uniform procedures for the awarding of state contracts. See supra 
notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
98. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 13-201(b), 13-202 (1985) (recodified at MD. 
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-109(b), 11-110 (1987». For a discussion of 
competitive sealed bidding and mistakes in bidding, see Maryland Port Admin. v. 
John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 492 A.2d 281 (1985). 
99. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-202(g) (1985); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, 
§ 05.01.02 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § ll-11O(b)(5) 
(1987». 
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Procurement Article establishes specific clauses that must be included in 
all state construction contracts. lOG The clauses are contained in regula-
tions that have been promulgated to implement the provisions of the Pro-
curement Article. 101 These mandatory clauses are designed to allocate 
fairly the risks inherent in the construction of public works projects. 102 
Third, the Procurement Article establishes the Maryland State Board of 
Contract Appeals (MSBCA). 
The General Assembly recognized that MDOT BCA had operated 
successfully since 1978 as a forum for resolution of disputes. MDOT 
BCA functioned from July 1, 1978, until July 1, 1981, when MSBCA 
succeeded it. 103 The Procurement Article endows MSBCA with even 
broader powers than those enjoyed by MDOT BCA, and makes MSBCA 
a permanent part of Maryland's system for procurement of public works. 
All of the appeals pending before MDOT BCA on July 1, 1981, were 
transferred automatically to MSBCA.I04 The transfer of appeals from 
one board to the other did not impact on the parties' rights because the 
rules and regulations of MSBCA were similar to those of MDOT 
BCA.105 
There are two particularly important differences between MDOT 
BCA and MSBCA. The major difference between the old MDOT BCA 
and new MSBCA is that MSBCA has much broader jurisdiction than did 
MDOT BCA. Instead of merely having jurisdiction over disputes regard-
ing contracts entered into by the Department of Transportation, as did 
MDOT BCA, MSBCA has jurisdiction over disputes relating to any con-
tract entered into by the state. 106 In addition, MSBCA has jurisdiction to 
hear and decide bid protests, which are disputes relating to the formation 
of state contracts. 107 Prior to the establishment of MSBCA, bid protests 
were resolved summarily by the Board of Public Works. The practice of 
summary resolution of bid protests by the Board of Public Works was 
altered by the General Assembly because it left the state vulnerable to 
public criticism of political favoritism. !Os 
100. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-602(a) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122(A) (1987)). 
101. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 07.01.01 to 07.02.10 (1985). 
102. Livingston, The Proposed New DSC Clause-A Mistake, Daily Record, Jan. 15, 
1985, at 3, col. 3. 
103. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 26, 1980 Md. Laws 2745. 
104. [d. at § 22. 
105. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 10.07.01 to 10.07.08 (1981). 
106. Compare MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-603(b) (Supp. 1979) (repealed by Act of 
May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 21, 1980 Md. Laws 2727) (jurisdiction limited to disputes 
arising under contract with MDOT) with MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 17-
201 (d), 17-202(c)(1) (1985) (jurisdiction over disputes relating to contract with 
state) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-137(D)(I), 11-
138(c)(1) (1987)). 
107. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-201(e)(I) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-137(F)(1) (1987)). 
108. Livingston, State Bid Projects Face Shift in Jurisdiction, Daily Record, Dec. 21, 
1983, at 3, col. 1. 
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The second difference between MDOT BCA and MSBCA concerns 
the right of a state agency to obtain judicial review of a decision by a 
board of contract appeals. A decision by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland established that an agency was an "aggrieved party" who 
could appeal a decision of MDOT BCA. \09 The Procurement Article 
spells out the right of either party to seek judicial review of a decision 
rendered by MSBCA.I \0 
B. Decisions By The Boards 0/ Contract Appeals 
In the process of hearing disputes between private contractors and 
the state, both MSBCA and MDOT BCA have generated a substantial 
body of case law on disputes relating to contracts with the state. I II The 
body of case law on bid protests and performance disputes provides pre-
cedent to guide the resolution of disputes. 
Only three decisions on construction disputes rendered by either 
MDOT BCA or MSBCA have been reviewed by Maryland appellate 
courts. The three decisions involve claims brought against state agencies 
by contractors. One decision, Maryland Port Administration v. C J. 
Langen/elder & Son, Inc., 112 clearly establishes that the board of contract 
appeals is empowered to give complete relief to contractors doing busi-
ness with the state. The other two decisions, Mass Transit Administration 
v. Granite Construction Co. 113 and Maryland Port Administration v. John 
W. Brawner Contracting Co., 114 involve the application of traditional 
concepts of contract law to resolve disputes between a contractor and a 
state agency. 
1. Power to Resolve Disputes 
C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., contracted with the Maryland Port 
Administration (MPA) to dredge portions of Baltimore Harbor. Three 
claims arose during contract performance. All three claims were denied 
by the MP A procurement officer and a timely appeal was taken to 
MDOT BCA. 
109. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 438 
A.2d 1374 (1982). MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215 (1984) provides ag-
grieved parties with the right to appeal. 
110. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 9, 1980 Md. Laws 2690 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 21, § 7-203(b) (1981) (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 17-203(b) (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-
139(b) (1987)). 
111. For an excellent summary of the case law on bid protests developed by MSBCA, see 
the article presented by Allan S. Levy, Associate Member of the Board, to a 
MICPEL seminar dated Sept. 22, 1984. See also Kennedy Temporaries v. Comp-
troller of the Treasury, 57 Md. App. 22, 39-41, 468 A.2d 1026, 1034-35 (1984) 
(discussing bid protest requirements). 
112. 50 Md. App. 525, 438 A.2d 1374 (1982). 
113. 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984). 
114. 330 Md. 44, 492 A.2d 281 (1985). 
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The first claim, Appeal of C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 115 required 
MDOT BCA to interpret the provisions of a contract for a maintenance 
dredging project. The contract did not indicate that Langenfelder would 
have to remove original river bottom material from elevations above pro-
ject grade. I 16 Because substantial portions of original river bottom were 
encountered above project grade, Langenfelder sought an equitable ad-
justment under the Differing Site Condition Clause in its contract with 
the state. 117 
MDOT BCA interpreted the term "maintenance dredging" to mean 
the parties had intended that only materials resulting from natural silta-
tion would be dredged from above grade. I IS MDOT BCA ruled that the 
presence of original river bottom above project grade constituted a latent 
physical condition at the site that was compensable under the Differing 
Site Condition Clause. 119 MDOT BCA overruled the MP A procurement 
officer's decision and granted Langenfelder's claim for an equitable 
adjustment. 
During its determination of the second claim, which involved a re-
quest for an equitable adjustment for increased costs engendered by an 
MP A change order, MDOT BCA recognized that the contractor's bid 
was based on the unit price of material to be removed. During contract 
performance, MPA changed the contract by deleting the least costly area 
to be dredged, which made the unchanged work more expensive, on the 
average, than contemplated in the contractor's estimate. 120 MDOT BCA 
ruled that the deletion of the·least costly area constituted a "constructive 
115. Appeal of C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 35-52 (Aug. 
15, 1980). 
116. [d. at 44-46. 
117. The Differing Site Conditions Clause included in the Langen/elder contract, G.P.-
4.04(A), is similar to the clause set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.02.04 
(1985), which provides for equitable adjustment in the following manner: 
[d. 
(1) The Contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are 
disturbed, notify the procurement officer in writing of: (1) subsurface or 
latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indi-
cated in this contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site of an 
unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and 
generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in 
this contract. The procurement officer shall promptly investigate the con-
ditions, and if he finds that such conditions do materially differ and cause 
an increase or decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required 
for, performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether or 
not changed as a result of such conditions, an equitable adjustment shall 
be made and the contract modified in writing accordingly. 
118. MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 44-50. 
119. [d. at 50. 
120. MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 17 (Aug. 15, 1980). The contract at issue in Langen/elder 
contained a Construction Changes Clause. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.02.01 
(1985) sets out a Changes Clause that is required to be included in all state construc-
tion contracts. The Changes Clause provides for constructive changes as follows: 
(1) The procurement officer may, at any time, without notice to the 
sureties, if any, by written order designated or indicated to be a change 
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change" requmng an equitable adjustment of the contract price. 121 
MP A's alteration of the contract requirements modified the performance 
required under the contract. Accordingly, MDOT BCA equitably ad-
justed the unit price of dredging to reflect the increase in unit cost of 
performance caused by MPA's deletion of the least costly dredging.122 
The third claim concerned an allegation by the contractor that the 
presence of debris in the area to be dredged constituted a differing site 
condition. 123 MDOT BCA found that the presence of debris did not con-
stitute a differing site condition and rejected this claim on the ground 
that an adequate pre-bid site investigation would have alerted the con-
tractor to the presence of most of the debris.124 MDOT BCA, however, 
granted an equitable adjustment to the contractor under the Changes 
Clause as compensation for cost increases resulting from the removal of 
Id. 
order, make any change in the work within the general scope of the con-
tract, including but not limited to changes: 
(a) In the specifications (including drawings and designs); 
(b) In the method or manner of performance of the work; 
(c) In the State-furnished facilities, equipment, materials, services, or 
site; or 
(d) Directing acceleration in the performance of the work. 
(2) Any other written order or an oral order (which terms as used in 
this paragraph (2) shall include direction, instruction, interpretation or de-
termination) from the procurement officer which causes any such change, 
shall be treated as a change order under this clause, provided that the 
Contractor gives the procurement officer written notice stating the date, 
circumstances, and source of the order and that the Contractor regards the 
order as a change order. 
121. MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 18. For a discussion of the concept of constructive 
change, see II NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 68, at 1206-59. 
122. MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 18-25. 
123. MDOT BCA No. 1006, at 55 (Aug. 15, 1980). 
124. Id. at 58. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.02.05 (1985) requires the following Site 
Investigation Clause in all construction contracts: 
Id. 
The Contractor acknowledges that he has investigated and satisfied 
himself as to the conditions affecting the work, including but not restricted 
to those bearing upon transportation, disposal, handling and storage of 
materials, availability of labor, water, electric power, roads and uncertain-
ties of weather, river stages, tides or similar physical conditions at the site, 
the conformation and conditions of the ground, the character of equip-
ment and facilities needed preliminary to and during prosecution of the 
work. The Contractor further acknowledges that he has satisfied himself 
as to the character, quality and quantity of surface and subsurface materi-
als or obstacles to be encountered insofar as this information is reasonably 
ascertainable from an inspection of the site, including all exploratory work 
done by the State, as well as from information presented by the drawings 
and specifications made a party of this contract. Any failure by the Con-
tractor to acquaint himself with the available information may not relieve 
him from responsibility for estimating properly the difficulty or cost of 
successfully performing the work. The State assumes no responsibility for 
any conclusions or interpretations made by the Contractor on the basis of 
the information made available by the State. 
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certain types of debris. 125 
In addition to providing equitable adjustments to the contractor on 
all three claims, MDOT BCA allowed predecision interest on the adjust-
ments. The predecision interest was granted as compensation for the loss 
of use of funds during the period from the date the contractor incurred 
the extra cost to the date of the MDOT BCA decision. 126 MDOT BCA 
also allowed postdecision interest on the three claims. The award of 
postdecision interest ran from the date on which the MDOT BCA deci-
sion was issued through the date on which MP A paid the contractor in 
accordance with the decision. 127 
Dissatisfied with the decision rendered by MDOT BCA, MP A 
sought judicial review in the Baltimore City Court. MP A challenged 
MDOT BCA's award of predecision and postdecision interest to the con-
tractor on all three claims. Although the Baltimore City Court held that 
MP A had a right to judicial review of MDOT BCA's decision under the 
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act,128 it upheld MDOT BCA's de-
cision awarding interest. 129 
Both parties appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
The court of special appeals reviewed the decisions rendered by MDOT 
BCA and the Baltimore City Court. In its review of Langenfelder's argu-
ment that MP A lacked standing to challenge the MDOT BCA decision, 
the court engaged in a detailed examination of the relationship between 
MP A and MDOT BCA. 130 The court observed that MDOT BCA's pow-
ers "lay somewhere between that of an arbitration panel and that of a 
court."J31 MPA, on the other hand, was not a quasi-judicial agency at-
tempting to uphold its decisions. 132 The court determined that MP A had 
125. MDOT BCA No. 1006, at 59. 
126. MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 52; MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 32-34; MDOT BCA No. 
1006, at 61. 
127. MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 52; MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 35; MDOT BCA No. 
1006, at 61. 
128. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 24-P/317/0-105150, at 1 
(Baltimore City Court, Mar. 24, 1981) (incorporating by reference memorandum 
opinion of Cardin, J., Dec. 5, 1980); see also MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-
215 (1984) (providing aggrieved parties with the right to appeal). 
129. Id. at 4. The Baltimore City Court, per Judge Greenfeld, observed that the contract 
between MP A and Langenfelder did not contain a provision that prohibited the 
award of predecision interest as part of an equitable adjustment. Shortly thereafter, 
MDOT introduced a provision that prohibited predecision interest as part of an 
equitable adjustment. See STATE HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION STANDARD SPECIFI-
CATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS § 10.01, at 77 (Jan. 1982). The award 
of predecision interest by the court of special appeals in Langen/elder created a 
question as to the enforceability of the provision. This question was resolved by the 
General Assembly in its 1986 session. The General Assembly passed legislation that 
rendered the provision unenforceable. See Procurement Law-Interest on Contract 
Claims Act, ch. 863, 1986 Md. Laws. 
130. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 528-31, 
545,438 A.2d 1374, 1375-77, 1385 (1982). 
131. Id. at 545, 438 A.2d at 1385. 
132. Id. at 533-34, 438 A.2d at 1379. 
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standing to appeal the adverse MDOT BCA decision, because it was an 
"aggrieved party within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure 
Act." 133 
In its opinion, the court examined the authority of MDOT BCA to 
allow contractors compensation for the cost of financing work not con-
templated in the contract. MDOT BCA allowed this compensation, 
which is often referred to as "interest," as part of the equitable adjust-
ment. 134 The court explained that an equitable adjustment can be viewed 
as the exchange of mutual consideration between contractors and the 
state: 
[An equitable adjustment] is part of-and is to some extent the 
quid pro quo-for an arrangement whereby the contractor 
agrees not to stop work when a dispute arises, but to proceed in 
accordance with the government's directives, reserving for ad-
ministrative resolution the question of how much, if anything, 
it is entitled to as a result of the changed conditions. 135 
In instances where the state modifies a contract, an equitable adjustment 
is granted to compensate the contractor fully for its increased perform-
ance costs. 136 
The court viewed predecision interest as compensation for the cost 
of financing additional work engendered by the contract modification. t37 
Although the court recognized that Maryland law did not mandate the 
award of predecision interest, the court accepted the notion, applicable to 
federal contracting practices, that the contractor is not compensated 
fully unless he receives compensation for his financing costs: 
there can be no equitable adjustment until the contractor recov-
ers the entire cost of doing the extra work, and the cost of 
money to finance the additional work is a legitimate cost of the 
work itself. This is true whether the cost of the money is in the 
form of interest paid on borrowed funds or the loss of income 
on the contractor's own capital invested in the additional 
work. 13S 
133. Id. at 537,438 A.2d at 1380-81. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 1O-215(a) (1984) 
provides that "[a] party who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is 
entitled to judicial review .... " 
134. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 538-46, 
438 A.2d 1374, 1382-86 (1982). 
135. /d. at 540, 438 A.2d at 1382. For a discussion of comparable disputes clauses in 
Baltimore City public works contracts, see James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Ad-
min., 63 Md. App. 74, 78-79, 492 A.2d 308, 310 (1985). 
136. See Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 516, 518 (Ct. Cl. 1963). 
137. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 539-45, 
438 A.2d 1374, 1383 (1982). 
138. Id. at 543, 438 A.2d at 1384 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS & SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., CONTRACTS DISPUTES ACT OF 1978, S. REP. 
No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5235, 5266). 
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Moreover, determination of the amount of predecision interest is based 
upon, as nearly as possible, actual cost to the contractor, rather than a 
standard borrowing rate, such as the prime rate, which may not reflect 
the contractor's cost. The court of special appeals endorsed MDOT 
BCA's ruling that predecision interest begins to accrue on the earliest 
date that the state reasonably should have known the dollar amount of 
the contractor's claims. 139 
The court also found that MDOT BCA was empowered to award 
postdecision interest to Langenfelder. l40 The court, however, held that 
the award of postdecision interest at the ten percent rate used by MDOT 
BCA exceeded the permissible legal rate. 141 Therefore, the case was re-
manded to the Baltimore City Court for modification of the rate of 
postdecision interest. 142 
2. Unjust Enrichment 
In Mass Transit Administration v. Granite Construction Co., 143 the 
contractor was involved in a dispute with the state concerning work it 
had performed on the Baltimore Metro project. During the preparation 
of its bid on a contract to build a subway station for the Baltimore Metro 
project, Granite obtained an oral interpretation of certain plans from an 
official of the contracting agency, the Mass Transit Administration 
(MTA). Although the MT A official explained that he was not the proper 
person to interpret the plans, Granite solicited his opinion on whether 
Granite or a third party utility company would have to relocate gas lines. 
Eventually, the MTA official opined that the plans obligated the utility 
company, not the bidder, to relocate the gas lines. In reliance on the 
MT A official's statement, Granite omitted from its bid the cost of relo-
cating the gas lines. 
Prior to the award of the contract, Granite, the low bidder, was 
informed that it would have to relocate the gas lines. After all of the gas 
lines had been relocated, Granite's field representatives learned of the 
pre-bid oral opinion given by the MT A official. l44 Granite then filed a 
139. [d. at 545, 438 A.2d at 1385. See Procurement Law-Interest on Contract Claims 
Act, ch. 863, 1986 Md. Laws (providing that interest may not accrue from a date 
before receipt of the claim by the procurement officer for a specific agency); Pro-
curement Law-Interest on Contract Appeal Decisions Act, ch. 852, 1986 Md. Laws 
(providing that interest accrues at a rate of 10 percent per annum). 
140. [d. at 545-46, 438 A.2d at 1385-86. 
141. [d. at 546, 438 A.2d at 1386. The court of special appeals held that the "legal" rate 
of interest for MOOT BCA awards was six percent. [d. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 11-107(a) (Supp. 1985), which permits interest on judgments at the 
rate of 10% per annum, only applies to judgments rendered by a court. [d. 
142. Effective July 1,1986 the rates ofpredecision and postdecision interest will be gov-
erned by statute. See Procurement Law-Interest on Contract Appeal Decisions Act, 
ch. 852, 1986 Md. Laws (codified at MD. ST. FIN & PROC. CoDE ANN. § 17-203 
(1986». 
143. 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984). 
144. [d. at 771-72, 471 A.2d at 1123-24. 
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claim seeking additional compensation for what it alleged was additional 
work. 
Following the denial of its claim by MTA, Granite appealed the 
agency's decision to MSBCA. MSBCA also denied Granite's claim. Fol-
lowing MSBCA denial, Granite filed a motion for reconsideration, argu-
ing that MTA had been enriched unjustly in an amount equal to 
Granite's cost to relocate the gas lines. MSBCA denied Granite's claim, 
holding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment was not applicable. There-
after, Granite appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which 
reversed the MSBCAI45 and ordered MTA to pay Granite additional 
compensation. 
MT A appealed the decision by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Granite again argued that 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment applied and contended that it should 
be allowed to recover under a theory of quasi-contract. Granite argued 
that the opinion of the MTA official had misled it regarding the extent of 
its responsibilities under the contract. Therefore, Granite argued, MT A 
was enriched unjustly in the amount of the value of relocation of the gas 
lines, which had not been included in its bid. l46 
The court rejected Granite's claim for additional compensation, 
finding that MTA was not enriched unjustly. 147 Granite failed to demon-
strate that the enrichment was so unjust as to move the court to award 
compensation. The court cited two reasons for finding that Granite's reli-
ance on the MTA official's pre-bid oral statement was unreasonable. 
First, the MT A official explained to Granite that he could not provide an 
authoritative opinion regarding relocation of the gas lines. 148 Second, 
although the contract permitted prospective bidders to solicit explana-
tions of project specifications, it also provided that MT A was not bound 
by oral explanations. 149 
The court concluded that, even ifMTA had been enriched unjustly, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented recovery.150 The State of 
Maryland had waived the defense of sovereign immunity in contract 
cases only as to claims that involve written contracts. Because Granite's 
claim for unjust enrichment was premised upon the existence of a con-
tract implied in law, the claim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. 151 
145. Granite Constr. Co. v. Mass Transit Admin., No. 82197713, at 3 (Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore City, Iuly 29, 1981). 
146. Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 776-78,471 A.2d 
1121, 1127 (1984). 
147. [d. at 780, 471 A.2d at 1128. 
148. [d. at 777, 471 A.2d at 1126-27. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. at 780-81, 471 A.2d at 1128. 
151. [d. at 780, 471 A.2d at 1128. 
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3. Reformation of Contract 
Maryland Port Administration v. John W. Brawner Contracting 
Co. 152 included two factually similar cases that were consolidated for ap-
peal. Two contractors submitted bids to the state containing arithmetic 
errors. Both contractors were low bidders on their respective contracts 
and were awarded the contracts. Following award, the contractors dis-
covered the errors in their bids and asked the state agencies that commis-
sioned the projects to correct the contract prices to compensate for the 
bid errors. Both contractors decided to proceed with their contracts; 
however, the agencies refused to alter the contract prices. 
In separate appeals to MSBCA, each contractor argued that, under 
the reformation of contract doctrine, the agencies wrongfully refused to 
correct contract price. The agencies argued that both cases should be 
resolved by applying a state regulation that addressed the correction of 
bid mistakes discovered after contract award. 153 The regulation provided 
that "changes in price are not permitted" following award. 154 MSBCA 
construed this regulation to mean that the agencies could permit correc-
tion where it would be "unconscionable not to do SO."155 Both cases were 
remanded to the respective agency heads for a determination as to 
whether it would be unconscionable not to provide the requested price 
modifications. 
The state appealed both cases to the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Baltimore City, which upheld the MSBCA decisions. 156 On review, the 
court of appeals reversed the MSBCA and the circuit court. The court of 
appeals held that the reformation of contract doctrine was not applicable. 
In order for a court of equity to reform a written contract, there must be 
either mutual mistake by the parties or the making of the contract must 
be tainted by fraud, duress, or inequitable conduct. 157 Both cases in-
volved unilateral mistakes by the contractors, and neither case involved 
allegations of fraud, duress, or inequitable conduct. Therefore, the con-
tracts would not be reformed in order to compensate for allegedly mis-
taken low bid prices. 158 
152. 303 Md. 44, 492 A.2d 281 (1985). 
153. Appeal of John W. Brawner Contracting Co., MSBCA No. 1085, at 6 (July 25, 
1983); Appeal of J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., MSBCA No. 1078, at 3 (July 25, 
1983). 
154. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 05.02.12D (1983). 
155. Appeal of John W. Brawner Contracting Co., MSBCA No. 1085, at 10 (July 25, 
1983); Appeal of J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., MSBCA No. 1078, at 4 (July 25, 
1983). 
156. Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., No. 83236025, at 3 
(Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City, July 13, 1984); Maryland State 
Board of Contract Appeals v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., No. 83235003, at 3 
(Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City, July 13, 1984). Compare Mayor of 
Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956). 
157. Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 59,492 
A.2d 281, 288 (1985). 
158. [d. 
242 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
More significantly, the court of appeals held that, under the regula-
tion, the agencies lacked discretion to correct the bid price after contract 
award. In the opinion of the court, the regulation was promulgated to 
prevent chicanery and to inspire public confidence in the bidding pro-
cess. 159 In the court's view, holding in favor of the contractors would 
ignore the regulatory provision that "[c]hanges in price are not 
permitted." 160 
C. 1985 Architectural and Engineering Procurement Legis/ation 
During the 1985 legislative session, the General Assembly enacted 
legislation to change the 1974 laws governing the procurement of archi-
tectural and engineering services. 161 The 1985 law is modeled on federal 
legislation that established a federal policy of negotiating architectural 
and engineering contracts on the basis of demonstrated qualification for 
the type of professional services required at a reasonable price. 162 
The 1974 legislation, which radically revised the practices used to 
procure architectural and engineering services, had received a substantial 
amount of criticism. 163 Critics of the 1974 legislation argued that it took 
too long to select the architects and engineers. Emphasis on the price 
criterion led to lower quality design because state officials were reluctant 
to opt for higher priced services associated with better technical propos-
als. Emphasis on the price criterion, in turn, resulted in lower quality 
design engineering. Occasionally, additional disputes arose during the 
construction phase of the project, because cheaper, lower quality design 
proposals led to defective plans. 
The 1985 law abolished a crucial provision of the 1974 law which 
provided that neither price nor technical proposal would be the sole cri-
terion for selection. l64 Although this provision ostensibly provided for 
selection based on both price and technical proposal, in reality, under the 
1974 law selection was based primarily on price. 165 
159. [d. at 59-60,492 A.2d at 287. See MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-201(b) 
(1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-102(b) (1987». 
160. 330 Md. 44, 60, 492 A.2d 281, 289. 
161. Act of May 28,1985, ch. 744, § I, 1985 Md. Laws 3514 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-107, 19-109, 19-109.1, 19-111, 19-209, 19-211 (1985» (re-
codified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-155, 11-157, 11-157.1, 11-159, 
11-175, 11-177 (1987». 
162. 40 U.S.C. 542 (1982). 
163. See 1985 HEARINGS ON THE AWARD OF ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING 
CONTRACTS, supra note 76 (MDOT written testimony, at 1-2). 
164. See Act of May 31,1974, ch. 732, § 1,1974 Md. Laws 2532 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 41, § 231-0 (Supp. 1975» (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 19-109(a)(2) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. §§ I I-I 57(a)(2), (1987». The provision of the 1974 law providing that neither 
price nor technical proposal would be the sole selection criterion was abolished by 
the Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 744, § I, 1985 Md. Laws 3514 (codified at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 19-109 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 11-157 (1987». 
165. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
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The 1985 law calls for the Departments of General Services and 
Transportation to negotiate an architectural and engineering contract 
with the most qualified firm at a rate of compensation each agency deter-
mines is fair, competitive, and reasonable. 166 The 1985 law encourages 
architects and engineers not to compromise the quality of design services 
and to present solutions that may cost more to design but save money 
during the construction phase. 167 Design proposals submitted for a par-
ticular project are evaluated to determine whether technically superior 
proposals justify higher prices. No longer must consultants submit their 
cheapest proposals or risk elimination from the competition by a less ex-
pensive proposal. 
If the agencies are unable to negotiate a satisfactory contract at a 
reasonable price with the firm that is considered most qualified, they ter-
minate the negotiations l68 and initiate negotiations with the second most 
qualified firm.169 The agencies are required to follow the same proce-
dure in their negotiations with the second most qualified firm and at-
tempt to negotiate a contract at a fair price. 170 This process continues 
until the agencies have contracted with a qualified firm at a fair price. 
This method of awarding contracts is designed to protect Maryland tax-
payers because architects and engineers know that the agencies will ter-
minate negotiations if unreasonable fees are demanded.l7l 
Under the 1985 law, the Transportation and General Services Selec-
tion Boards have assumed more of a supervisory role than they had 
under the 1974 law. For example, both boards can delegate negotiations 
to subordinate committees, which are akin to the old consultant screen-
ing committees. l72 The boards, however, must review all contract docu-
ments at public meetings. 173 In an effort to continue to prevent the 
166. Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 744, § 1, 1985 Md. Laws 3515-18 (codified at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(2) (Gen. Serv.) 
(1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2) (Transp.), 
11-175(a)(2) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)). 
167. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS -SELEC-
TION OF ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, S. REP. No. 1219, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4767, 4769. 
168. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(ii) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(2)(iii) (Gen. 
Serv.) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2)(ii) 
(Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(ii) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS -SELEC-
TION OF ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, S. REP. No. 1219, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4767, 4770 (assessing procure-
ment of architectural and engineering services for federal projects). 
172. MD. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(iv) (Transp. Selection Board), 
19-209(a)(2)(v) (Gen. Servo Selection Board) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. 11-157(a)(2)(iv) (Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(v) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)). 
173. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(v)(l) (Transp. Selection Board), 
19-209(a)(2)(vi)(I) (Gen. Servo Selection Board) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2)(v) (Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(vi) (Gen. Serv.) 
(1987)). 
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reemergence of pre-1974 abuses, the legislature requires that both boards 
make public all documents relating to a'fard, including proposals, inter-
nal work sheets, and all other information relevant to the negotiation of 
architectural and engineering contracts. 174 
In contrast to appeals over formation of other state construction 
contracts, bid protests regarding architectural and engineering contracts 
are decided by the Board of Public Works.175 This anomaly may have 
occurred because the 1974 legislation, which followed the 1973 resigna-
tion of Vice-President Agnew, was still rather new in 1981 when the 
MSBCA was established to hear bid protests. In addition, the Board of 
Public Works hears only a few bid protests over the award of consulting 
contracts. Hence, the General Assembly may have viewed as unnecessary 
the transfer to MSBCA of bid protests regarding architectural and engi-
neering contracts. 
Passage of the 1985 law by the General Assembly preserved the in-
tegrity of architectural and engineering procurement and dispensed with 
the excessive concern over securing architectural and engineering con-
tracts at the lowest possible price. The 1985 law achieves a fair balance 
between the state's interest in allowing true competition for architectural 
and engineering contracts and the taxpayers' preference for reasonable 
expenditures by the state. The 1985 law should provide the state with 
efficient, high-quality architectural and engineering services, in a manner 
that is consistent with the public's demand for an honest, cost-effective 
system of procurement in Maryland. Thus, the 1985 law promotes the 
major purposes and policies underlying the Procurement Article.l76 
D. Minority Business Enterprise Program 
Since 1981, an increasing number of administrative decisions have 
addressed the factual circumstances that are sufficient to permit an appli-
cant to acquire MBE status. 177 As it has become more institutionalized, 
the MBE Program has established itself as somewhat of a fixture in 
Maryland procurement. The MBE Program has become a fixture despite 
the original purpose of the legislation, which was enacted as a temporary 
measure to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination. 
174. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(v)(2) (Transp. Selection Board), 
19-209(a)(2)(vi)(2) (Gen. Servo Selection Board) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2)(v)(2) (Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(vi)(2) (Gen. 
Serv.) (1987)). 
175. Compare MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-201(c)(I) (1985) (resolution of 
disputes relating to state construction contracts) with MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 17-201(g) (1985) (resolution of disputes relating to state contracts for archi-
tectural or engineering services) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 11-137(B)(I), 11-137(a) (1987)). 
176. See MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-201(b) (1985) (listing the purposes and 
policies of the Procurement Article) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 11-102(b) (1987)). 
177. In contracts for federally funded projects, the term "Disadvantaged Business Enter-
prise" is the functional equivalent of the term MBE. 
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In order to become certified as an MBE, a party must file a formal 
application with MDOT.178 Following receipt of the application, MDOT 
investigates, holds hearings, and issues a formal order of certification or 
denial. 179 Decisions rendered by MDOT are subject to judicial review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. ISO 
The certification process can be scholarly. The process focuses on 
details of an applicant's legal, financial, and business acumen and experi-
ence. ISI MDOT strives to ensure that the process remains fair, consistent 
with the rationale underlying the Procurement Article and the short-
term goal of ending discrimination against MBE participation on state 
contracts. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF PROCUREMENT IN MARYLAND 
In 1981, with the enactment of the Procurement Article,IS2 the Gen-
eral Assembly established a modem system of procurement in Maryland. 
The pre-1981 regime was characterized by laws that occasionally failed 
to separate the personal agendas of state politicians from procurement 
goals. The Procurement Article reduced the potential for abuse that pre-
vailed under the pre-1981 procurement system-especially that which 
prevailed under the pre-1976 system, when the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity largely prevented the courts from safeguarding contractors' 
rights. 
The major elements of the modem procurement system should not 
be subject to drastic change in the foreseeable future. The General As-
sembly should not revive the doctrine of sovereign immunity, nor should 
it amend the Procurement Article to require that state contracts include 
oppressive clauses that unfairly allocate risks to private contractors. Fur-
thermore, and perhaps most important, MSBCA must not be disestab-
lished unless a neutral forum for resolving disputes between contractors 
and the state is created to function in its place. 
In the future, it is likely that as the General Assembly modifies its 
conception of fair procurement policy, slight adjustments may be made 
to the administrative practices used to implement provisions in the Pro-
curement Article. The use of mandatory contract clauses, which make 
sense for large public works projects, may be withdrawn from contracts 
178. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 46-48; see also Certification of the Eligibility 
of Minority Business Enterprises, 49 C.F.R. § 23.51 (1985) (discussing federal certi-
fication requirements). 
179. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 50-58. 
180. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215 (1984); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, 
§ 01.14.12(A) (1984); see also Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 61 Md. 
App. 239, 248, 486 A.2d 224, 228 (1985) (holding that withdrawal of certification is 
reviewable). 
181. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 18-23. 
182. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650 (codified as amended at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 19-218 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. 
&PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 184) (1987». 
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for smaller procurements. In its 1986 session, the General Assembly 
passed legislation governing the debarment of contractors who engage in 
bribery and other nefarious activites. 183 This legislation provides new 
statutory standards for dealing with offending contractors. In addition, 
there may be other reformulations in policy if, for example, the General 
Assembly were to reconsider the use of state procurement to achieve 
socio-economic goals such as encouraging minority business enterprise 
participation in public works projects. 184 The elements of Maryland's 
modern procurement system provide a convenient framework for exami-
ning the potential for future modifications to the system. 
A. How to Award Construction Contracts 
Perhaps the state should examine whether contracts for construc-
tion of public works should be awarded invariably to the lowest bidder. 
Instead, the state could require that construction contracts be awarded 
on the basis of demonstrated qualifications at a reasonable price, as are 
architectural and engineering contracts. Abolishing the current system 
for awarding construction contracts would contravene conventional pub-
lic policy, which posits that award to the low bidder promotes a sense of 
fair treatment by the state; however, abolishing the current system might 
lessen the amount of litigation between contractors and the state. By 
awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, the contractor and the state 
are placed in a potentially adversarial posture. Each party compromises 
only as much as is necessary to accomplish what oftentimes appear to be 
mutually exclusive goals: the contractor seeks to lower his performance 
costs and the state demands maximum performance. 18S 
Unfortunately, there are few realistic alternatives to the low bid 
method of contract award. In the private sector, where the public treas-
ury is not at risk, construction contracts may be awarded by a number of 
informal means. Moreover, in the private sector, competitive negotiation, 
such as that used by the state to award architectural and engineering 
contracts, is reasonable because it involves a private owner negotiating 
among several prospective contractors, each of whom compete for the 
contract. Owners in the private sector are free to spend their money in 
any manner they choose. Competitive negotiations are an acceptable 
method in the private sector because the public is not interested in 
whether private owners spend their money wisely. 
By contrast, the public expects taxpayers' funds to be spent in an 
183. Procurement Law Revision Act, ch. 840, 1986 Md. Laws (repealing current version 
and enacting MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. 11-211 (1987» (providing for de-
barment of contractors for offenses other than bribery) (current version at MD. ST. 
FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. § 13-405 (1985»; see also MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
21.08.04.04 (1985) (setting forth grounds for debarment of businesses). 
184. MD. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-148) (1987». 
185. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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equitable manner. Therefore, contractors should be selected by the state 
on the basis of objective, measurable criteria. Because it permits the state 
to award contracts in an equitable manner, low bid is the best method for 
awarding contracts for the construction of public works. 
The modern system of Maryland procurement generally utilizes the 
low bid method; however, it contains provisions that grant latitude to 
experiment. Although award to the lowest bidder is the preferred method 
of awarding state contracts, the executive branch is not barred, as a mat-
ter of state law, from experimenting with alternative approaches for 
awarding construction contracts. For example, contracts for the design 
and construction of a public works project do not always have to be 
awarded separately. In the case of certain extraordinary projects, such as 
the Hart-Miller Islands Spoil Disposal facility,186 a single contract for 
design and construction could be awarded without running afoul of the 
Procurement Article. 
In the awarding of contracts for construction of ordinary public 
works projects (highways, prisons, bridges, or water treatment facilities), 
use of the low bid method of award is standard practice. Award to the 
lowest responsive and responsible bidder provides contractors and the 
public with the impression that state contracts are awarded fairly, be-
cause each bidder must compete for the contract on an equal footing. 
Hence, award to the low bidder is the order of the day in Maryland, and 
will remain so in the foreseeable future. 
B. Contract Terms 
With respect to future procurement of construction services for pub-
lic works projects in Maryland, there should be little change in the fore-
seeable furture. One major policy issue confronts the state, however. 187 
The issue is whether the General Assembly should continue to require 
that all of the current clauses be included in contracts for the construc-
tion of public works. The General Assembly, in 1981, identified the im-
portance of making sure that all state construction contracts were fairly 
uniform. Thus, the Procurement Article mandates that all public works 
construction contracts contain certain clauses. 188 Regulations promul-
gated to implement provisions of the Procurement Article generally es-
tablish uniform terms for all such mandatory clauses. The mandatory 
186. See Hart & Miller Islands Area Envtl. Group, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army, 
621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1980). 
187. There are numerous other issues facing the General Assembly with respect to state 
procurement. A number of these issues were raised in House Bill 100, which was 
subject to hearings in the House Committee on Constitutional and Administrative 
Law on January 23, 1985 and the Senate Committee on Economic and Environmen-
tal Affairs on June 4, 1985. For a good discussion of the issues, see Garrett, Report 
o/the Ad Hoc House Bill 100 Subcommittee a/the Public Contract Law Committee, 
MD. BAR Assoc. SEC. STATE & LOCAL GOV'T LAW (Aug. 13, 1985). 
188. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-602(a) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. 
& PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122(A) (1987)). 
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clauses fairly deal with the allocation of risks inherent in public works 
construction and there is no foreseeable reason to revert back to oppres-
sive clauses. 
Recently, however, legislation was proposed that would have elimi-
nated a number of the mandatory clauses. For example, in 1985, House 
Bill 100 originally proposed to delete the Differing Site Conditions 
Clause. 189 Although the Differing Site Conditions Clause was reinserted, 
the final version of the bill called for the removal of other clauses. 190 
House Bill 100 was not enacted; however, its existence as a proposal 
demonstrates that certain misgivings are held about the wisdom of cur-
rent procurement law. Perhaps the drafters of House Bill 100 believed 
that deleting the clauses would clarify procurement law and simplify the 
process of procurement in Maryland. 191 
There is little justification for deleting any of the mandatory clauses. 
By now, most contractors and state officials are familiar with the clauses. 
The mandatory clauses are similar to clauses used in the federal sector; 
thus, a body of federal law currently exists to guide the interpretation of 
the mandatory clauses in Maryland cases. 192 More importantly, the 
clauses are practical and fair. Since 1981, nothing has transpired that 
would justify their deletion. In current form, the mandatory clauses pro-
vide a balanced and reasonable allocation of the risks inherent in public 
works construction. 
C Dispute Resolution 
MSBCA provides contractors and the state with a neutral forum in 
which to settle their contract disputes. So long as the parties to a public 
works contract are bound to a fixed contract price-especially one which 
is invariably the lowest bid-there will be disputes during the construc-
tion of public works. Because disputes are inherent in the public works 
construction process, a reasonable procedural means for resolution of 
189. § 11-122, H.B. 100, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. (First Reader). See also Living-
ston, The Proposed New DSC Clause-A Mistake, Daily Record, Jan. 15, 1985, at 3, 
col. 3. 
190. E.g., the Variations in Estimated Quantities Clause. See § 11-122(c), H.B. 100, Md. 
Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. (Third Reader). For a MSBCA decision construing the 
Variations in Estimated Quantities Clause, see Appeal of Martin G. Imbach, 
MSBCA No. 1020 (May 31, 1983) .. 
191. See § ll-102(b)(7), H.B. 100, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. (First Reader). See Pro-
curement, 1985: Hearings on House Bil/100 before Senate Economic & Environmen-
tal Affairs Committee, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Interim Sess. (June 4, 1985) 
(statement of William S. James, State Treasurer). 
192. See Dewey Jordan, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n., 
258 Md. 490, 265 A.2d 892 (1970) (referring to federal case law for guidance in 
construing provisions of a contract between a Maryland public corporate body and 
a contractor). For a comprehensive treatise on federal procurement law, which illus-
trates the manner in which state contract clauses are closely modeled on federal 
clauses, see II NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 68, at 1104-1356. 
1986] State Procurement 249 
disputes must be available to the parties. MSBCA satisfactorily serves 
this purpose. 
Unfortunately, there is a move afoot to diminish the power of 
MSBCA. In particular, the General Assembly recently has considered 
proposals to reduce its jurisdiction. In the 1985 and 1986 sessions, it was 
proposed that the jurisdiction over bid protests be shifted from MSBCA 
to the Board of Public Works.193 
There is no justification for removing bid protest jurisdiction from 
MSBCA to the Board of Public Works. 194 MSBCA is nonpolitical, in the 
sense that its membership does not receive any financial contributions 
from the parties who appear before it. Moreover, unlike decisions ema-
nating from the Board of Public Works, written decisions issued by 
MSBCA furnish a body of precedent to guide the resolution of future 
cases. 195 MSBCA has issued over sixty-five decisions since 1981, which 
are available to inform parties about their rights with respect to various 
issues of contract formation. Contractors can examine the MSBCA's de-
cisions to ascertain whether the merits of their protests justify an appeal. 
By contrast, the ability of the Board of Public Works to make de-
tailed findings of fact or conclusions of law is limited. The reasoning 
which underlies decisions rendered by the Board of Public Works is not 
always published. Hence, a body of guiding legal precedent would not be 
available to instruct future disputants. If the Board of Public Works were 
to have jurisdiction over disputes between contractors and the state, the 
contractors might be inclined to view political-rather than legal-fac-
tors as influential in the resolution of procurement disputes. Giving the 
Board of Public Works jurisdiction over procurement disputes would be 
a step backwards in the development of a modern procurement system. 
Instead, the jurisdiction of MSBCA over disputes ought to be ex-
panded. Counties and municipalities should use MSBCA to resolve their 
disputes with contractors. Indeed, the 1985 session of the General As-
sembly considered proposed legislation that would make MSBCA avail-
able to hear disputes over $10,000 that arise out of construction contracts 
with political subdivisions. 196 Passage of such legislation will promote 
193. See Policy Amendment No. 35, Hearings on House Bill 100 before House Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law Committee, Md. Gen. Assem., 1984 Sess. (policy 
amendment proposed by James Committee). The MSBCA has jurisdiction to hear 
appeals pertaining to disputes over contract formation, which are known as "bid 
protests," pursuant to MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-201(e)(1) (1985) 
(recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-137(E) (1987)). 
194. Livingston, State Bid Projects Face Shift in Jurisdiction, Daily Record, Dec. 21, 
1983 at 3, col. 1. 
195. But see letter from William S. James, State Treasurer to Senators Stone, Cushwa, 
and Kramer (Aug. 28, 1985) in which Mr. James argued that "[t]he development of 
a body of precedents by the Board of Contract Appeals is of little value to the 
average lawyer and of no value to the average citizen. It strengthens the monopoly 
of a few specialists, who represent big business." [d. A copy of the letter is on file 
with the author. 
196. H.B. 1490, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. See also Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 539, § 1, 
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the submission of lower-priced bids, because contractors will compete 
more vigorously for contracts with political subdivisions if, as is the case 
with state contracts, they are assured an impartial forum is available for 
resolution of disputes. 
Moreover, with respect to contracts involving the state agency 
known as the Interstate Division for Baltimore City, MSBCA should 
have jurisdiction over disputes arising out of contracts for federally 
funded highway projects between contractors and Baltimore City.197 
Giving MSBCA jurisdiction over such disputes would provide for uni-
form treatment of all disputes arising out of contracts for the construc-
tion of the interstate highway system. The MSBCA provides a practical 
and impartial forum for resolution of disputes, which should be available 
to disputants on all contracts that involve the expenditure of state funds. 
Although increased staffing for MSBCA may be necessary, such adminis-
trative expenses would be offset by the benefits of the lower priced bids 
that will result from more vigorous competition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The modern era of Maryland procurement began in 1976 when the 
General Assembly passed legislation that provided for a partial waiver of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Shortly thereafter, MDOT created a 
board of contract appeals, introduced standard clauses for inclusion in 
procurement contracts, and instituted responsible procedures for con-
tract award. These three safeguards were designed to enhance MDOT's 
ability to insure fair treatment for contractors. 
In 1981, with the passage of the Procurement Article by the General 
Assembly, the safeguards provided by MDOT became applicable to vir-
tually all state contracts. The policy of fair treatment for contractors do-
ing business with the State of Maryland was incorporated into law. In the 
future, the policy of providing fair treatment for contractors who do 
business with the state will continue to be a crucial aspect of Maryland 
procurement. 
1984 Md. Laws 2834 (supplementing Baltimore City Charter, art. II, § 4A (rev. 
1964) (providing that Baltimore City may not require disputes of more than $10,000 
to be decided by an officer or official body of Baltimore City). 
197. See James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 492 A.2d 308 
(1985). 
